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ll along. The dissertation will analyze ownership concentration of Chinese joint-stock companies to the influence of independent director institution. That is the combination governance efficiency of ownership structure to independent director institution. Under the premise of big shareholders select independent directors, how does the governance efficiency of independent directors bring into play? Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission requires listed companies building independent director institution, and the proportion of independent directors accounting for member of the board of directors must be not less than 1/3. In fact, more or less of the proportion of independent directors accounting for member of board of directors is not always very important. Many researches found that it does not exist obvious correlation between the proportion of independent directors and listed companies performance(such as Li Yougen (2001) etc, Gao Minghua & Ma Shouli(2002),Yu Dongzhi & Wang Huacheng(2003), Li Changqing & Lai Jianqing(2004), Ye Chunxia (2004) and so on). And under the premise of the first majority shareholder of Chinese listed companies holding a majority share, the choice and appointment of independent directors are often controlled by big shareholders. The governance efficiency of independent directors and if independent directors can restrain big shareholders misappropriation of assets should be worth paying attention.

The phenomenon of big shareholders occupying listed companies capital is very severe at the end of last century, and was paid more attention by all sectors of the community and securities governance departments. Under big shareholders' occupation is more severe, according to the advocacy of securities governance department, independent directors institution was built. For evading governance of the government, big shareholders are unavoidable to select obedient independent directors, which lead the production of independent director is endogenous. That is big shareholders who occupy listed companies capital are more severe may select the independent directors who can take orders from them. So, under what conditions independent directors can be independent? The dissertation considers that ownership structure can answer the question: ownership nature and the proportion of the first majority shareholder holding share may influence the independence of independent directors. Firstly, most of Chinese listed companies are controlled by government, state-owned property management institutions or state-owned enterprises. The corporation governance of the companies brings very strong administration color, board chairman even general manager are often appointed by the government departments. They have often definite administration position before they are appointed, and even during the holding office period, they have also administration position. They can always be promoted senior administration position after service maturity according to their work performance. So just like <The advisory opinions of about building independent director institution in listed companies>, <China Securities Regulatory Commission listed companies governance principles> etc governance administrative regulations can usually get efficient execution, the independence of independent director can get guarantee. Secondly, private holding shareholders have strong incentive of self interest maximization. Unde本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。