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year ending 31st march 2008 is collected from annual reports of the companies available from company websites. Most of the information about company history, board of directors, directors' family link and family presence in the board is collected from company's website and Directors database. We have included only those family firms in the sample for which required data was completely available and banks and financial institutions owned by family were excluded from being selected in the data due to the problems regarding calculating Tobin Q for these firms. In order to make our sample as a representative sample of Indian industries we tried to collect data from diversified industries which are indicated by table 1.

Table 2, above summarizes the descriptive statistics for performance variables (Tobin Q, ROGA & ROE) and other independent and control variables. As indicated from the table family shareholding is significantly high (mean = 49.26) in Indian family firms and on average around 25% of the promoters are present in board, most of them are family members or close relatives of family owning company which represent domination of family in the board. Moreover statistical results for our sample of 131 firms reveal that 71% of the firms are managed by family (either founder or successor) CEO and 88% of the firms are looked after by family chairman (executive or non executive) with duality in 37% cases. Statistics also reveal that on average half of the board is represented by outside directors ( 54%) as most of the companies following clause 49 requirement of SEBI. Table 2 also indicate that on average most of the firms have 1o directors in the board meeting more than five times in during the year.

Independent sample t test on the given sample reveal some interesting facts. Statistical analysis in table 3 indicate that smaller family firms have more promoters as compared to larger family firms and more promoters in the board lead to more frequent board meetings. Independent t test also reveal that older and bigger family firms with bigger board have family chairman and such type of board meet less frequently.

To analyse board operating mode specifically associated with a particular type of family characteristic we formulated a variable BOM( Board Operating Mode) by combining two variables board size and total number of board meetings in a financial year. We quantified BOM by assigning numbers 1 to 4 where 1 represents larger board high meeting frequency and 4 represents smaller board and low meeting frequency. We run a cross tab chi square test ( table 4) to find relationship of BOM with family characteristics and found that if promoters are less in a board then board meet less frequently but with the increase in the number of promoters (>25%) size of the board remain unchanged but meeting frequency increases. Further analysis indicates that family CEO doesn't have any impact on board operating mode but presence of family chairman have tendency to reduce size of board and to hold board meetings more frequently.

The Pearson correlation shown in table 5 indicates that Tobin Q is positively correlated with family share holding and negatively correlated with family CEO, ROGA doesn't show any correlation with family shareholding but negatively correlated with family CEO, third performance variable ROE doesn't show any correlation with any of the variables considered for this study. 本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。