英语论文网

nt responding to criticism, Yanshan clarified that the 1 yuan price was justified as the real estate company was burdened 14.6 million in debt and had negative net assets. As Qiu notes, however, Sinopec is sandwiched between SASAC/government and shareholders/market. One month prior, in response to overheating real estate market, central SASAC issued the infamous ‘exit order’ (qingtui ling), requiring that with the exception of sixteen CSOEs that specialize in real estate, all other CSOEs must exit the industry (amounting to over 220 subsidiaries under 78 different CSOEs) within six months. Sinopec Limited’s sale could be interpreted as an expression of its anger at SASAC’s order. By the end of 2010, Sinopec and PetroChina were joined only by five other CSOEs in jettisoning their real estate assets, leaving 71 other CSOEs with more than 200 subsidiaries still continuing their real estate businesses (Zheng 2010). As Cao (2000) has argued in a different context, this selling off of state assets occurred without any regulatory oversight (from SASAC or any other government bureau) or administrative appraisal, incurring a critical response from individuals regardless of stock market performance and viability of real estate businesses. Schizophrenia: Jilin Chemical Engineering Jilin Chemical Engineering was listed in Shanghai in 2003, raising 391 million yuan. It was 49% controlled by Jilin Chemical Group, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CNPC. Its main business is contracting oil and petrochemical, municipal utility, housing, smelting, power and electrical engineering and construction, with over 50% of its sales coming from CNPC subsidiaries. Only a few short years later, in late 2008, Jilin Chemical Group signed a share transfer and asset swap agreement with Shanxi Coal Import-Export Group. Shanxi Coal paid 620 million yuan for the remaining 39.75% controlling interest of the listed company. Also, in exchange for seven legally independent coal trading companies, CNPC was able to withdraw all assets, liabilities and staff from the listed vehicle, which now trades as Shanxi Coal International Energy. Owing to different values of assets swapped, Jilin Chemical Group was required to pay 52 million yuan to complete the deal. Despite starting in 2002 by selling off, swapping assets or repurchasing shares of numerous listed subsidiaries, reabsorbing and consolidating oil and petrochemical assets that were previously listed under PetroChina, CNPC choose to list, then de-list Jilin Chemical Engineering during this period. Yet this is not an isolated incident, or simply CNPC. On May 23, 2013, Sinopec Group’s Sinopec Engineering began trading on the Hong Kong stock market, with Sinopec Group holding 67% block of ownership. Kunlun Energy, another Hong Kong listed firm that is 62% controlled by CNPC, bought key gas pipeline assets by purchasing a majority share of Beijing Natural Gas Pipeline Company in December, 2010 (Wang and Zhang 2011). Bucking both the initial promise made to investors at the time of listing and the trend of consolidation of assets under their main listed vehicles, PetroChina and Sinopec Limited, CNPC and Sinopec Group have engaged in schizophrenic oscillation between building multi-divisional firms like those common in the West and expanding business groups with murky asset transfers and growing RPTs. Discussion What were the goals of CNPC and Sinopec Group in their delisting of companies over the past decade? Both Tang et al. (2006) a