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th to and from listed NOPCs nearly doubled over the five year period. PetroChina, in particular, utilizes outstanding payments to its group suppliers to keep capital from flowing out. Yet these can be argued to be business accounting expenses, a regular part of transacting in the oil and petrochemical industry. This interpretation is backed up by the significant decrease in ‘other’ related party transactions, which have fallen significantly, and average only a few million yuan per company. Potentially, these transactions provide a small opportunity for graft or malfeasance at a local level, but are increasingly insignificant for overall corporate financing. This, contrary to the examination of debt and finance companies, implies that NOPCs are increasingly utilizing internal finance for business-related expansion. It is in this context of property rights and corporate governance over state assets and businesses that listing on the stock market must be understood. Wang Yong, immediately prior to retiring as the head of SASAC, outlined the future direction of reforms to central and local SOEs as further listing on the stock market and creating boards of directors (Chang 2013). The goal is not to access capital, as this is abundantly available through bank loans and internal finance. An Economist (2001) story from Yanshan, a town on the outskirts of Beijing built and run by Sinopec Group, suggests another answer. Preparing for the listing of Sinopec Limited in 2000, Sinopec Group divided the town into productive and nonproductive assets (including people), while Morgan Stanley and KPMG consultants ran around holding study sessions with managers and employees on how to be a good capitalist. The irony of such a ‘campaign’ to change Yanshan townspeople’s ideology to index their value and daily work to such a fetishistic-financial sign as a stock market ticker was perhaps lost on the author at the time.20 To list assets, what was needed was to change managerial and employee frameworks of value to facilitate governance arising from the institution of the stock market. Sinopec Group, then as now, faced choices on how to maximize group and limited company resources to engage its historical welfare burden, lifetime commitment to employees, the running of town utilities, administration of local schools and hospitals, and management of (employee) apartment complexes. Financiers and investors view separation into productive (relative to financed business operations and activities) and non-productive parts as sufficient to ensure property rights of shareholders and resulting corporate governance. Yet the creation of property rights and goals of listing, in and of itself, for groups, and the resulting scrutiny through corporate governance, play out quite differently when the business group nature of the companies is understood. The findings of the four research questions explored in this paper yield important advances in understanding big business policy in China. Rather than ‘transitioning’ towards a market economy, big businesses have already transitioned, and the key sites at which corporate governance occurs are at the interfaces between state officials/SASAC and business groups and between business group parents and subsidiaries.

Following the The Economist author notes that the stock market price of the newly listed Sinopec Limited was subsequently prominently displayed in the lobby of the Sinopec headquarters bui本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。