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nd CITIC securities (Yin 2005) outline problems that are solved by ‘privatizing’ (delisting) subsidiaries. Among these are lack of capital (listed companies quickly lose the ability to attract fresh capital), shareholder interference (important decisions must pass through shareholder meetings), too much competition in the same national product and supply markets (subsidiaries competing for customers and resources), and excessive RPTs (hurt shareholders). The implication is that by making subsidiaries into branches under a dominant parent, similar to a multi-divisional firm, the problems will be solved or at least alleviated: less capital to subsidiaries means more capital for the parent; less scrutiny from shareholders means less interference in execution of business decisions from above; less competition makes it easier to make and sell products; and less RPTs means that all transactions become invisible inside the ‘visible hand’ of the multi-divisional corporation. This would confirm Brødsgaard’s (2012; Steinfeld 2010) insight that corporatization of state sector forces firms to act according to global market conditions, fortifying the commercial supremacy of the West. Yet evidence presented both in ownership chains, listing of new subsidiaries and expansion of related party transactions belies such a neat convergence. The NOPCs examined here, including some of the most powerful businesses in the world, also present evidence to the contrary. By listing, many of the NOPC group subsidiaries are, in fact, outsourcing scrutiny of and building capability for business operations rather than accessing capital as is normally assumed. Returning to RPTs, they show a slight decrease for NOPCs overall, as well as Sinopec Limited and PetroChina. Yet other NOPCs, both including and excluding Sinopec and CNPC subsidiaries, increased RPTs. In the case of purchases, the ratio to total costs has doubled, even as costs overall grew. The findings indicate that business group organization and development remains a significant, and increasingly important, aspect of the oil and petrochemical industry in China. On one hand, the shift over the period is towards much more reliance on suppliers to the NOPCs, differing from other findings (Lu et al. 2004) and perhaps indicative of the nature of the industry, with a limited number of suppliers of a scarce resource. On the other hand, Sinopec Limited and PetroChina have reduced their reliance on RPTs, particularly suppliers, as more of upstream oil and petrochemical supplies are transferred to their remit. Movement towards a Western multidivisional firm is reflected in the increasing ratio of RPTs for Sinopec Group/Sinopec Limited’s and CNPC/PetroChina’s subsidiaries. Thus, there are mixed results in terms of whether China and its NOPCs are operating in an environment where more market-supporting institutions are present. Evidence on financial market development outside business groups shows clearer evidence that external financial institutions have shown poor growth or effectiveness from 2007 to 2011. Debt-based financing grew, particularly for large, key CSOEs. Increasing utilization of finance companies is evident in the massive loans floated by CNPC, Sinopec Group, CNOOC, Sinochem and Norinco. NOPCs are moving away from external financial markets and scrutiny, suggesting more ineffectual finance markets in 2011 compared with 2007. Informal finance lends evidence to this conclusion. Outstanding payments bo