英语论文网

class='MsoNormal'> First, when the supplier in the relationship provides larger fractions of the manufacturer's business, the manufacturer is considered more dependent on it. Second, if the outcomes from alternative relationships are lower or worse that the outcomes from a current relationship, dependence on the partner from the current relationship increase. Hence, firms working with the best supplier on the market in terms of price, quality, etc. are more dependent. Therefore, the more manufacturers the best supplier works with, the more his influence over them is higher. It is like that, as the results obtained with this supplier are better than the possible outcomes from other not so 'good' suppliers. Third, as we already mentioned, dependence is enhanced when there are fewer alternative trade partners. If there are not many suppliers on the market to work with, a manufacturer does not have many choices to replace its suppliers. In that case, dependence is increased. [15]

Furthermore, when the partners contribute to an alliance with complementary resources, the degree of interdependence is higher and therefore, a low risk of mutual exploitation comes to the fore. Moreover, firms with complementary skills become better partners because the potential for direct competition in the end markets is reduced. [16] Discussing the level of dependence and the degree of dependence advantage, Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) focus on smaller, peripheral firms in their interactions with dominant buyers in retail distribution channel, where organizations interact to supply products and services to end users. [17] The relationship between suppliers and manufacturers is perceived to be the most common form of a strategic alliance. [18]

3 Dependence incentives

The factors causing dependence between actors in strategic alliances, which are going to be discussed in this study, can be embraced by two theories - transaction cost economics and social exchange theory.

3.1 Transaction cost theory

The transaction cost theory highlights the control and governance mechanism in strategic alliances, distinguishing joint ventures and non-equity alliances. Relating to the subject of the current study, transaction cost theory examine the relationship between actors in an alliance by suggesting that as transactors invest more in specificity assets, transaction costs increase, which makes both partners dependent on each other. Hence, transactors are threaten by hazards of opportunism. [19] As Williamson (199l) has argued, ‘asset specificity increases the transaction costs of all forms of governance. [20] Transaction-specific investments are tangible and intangible human and physical assets, which are required and specialized to support exchange. These assets are valuable only for the relationship, they are made for, and their value outside the relationship is very low. If this relationship were terminated, the value of these assets would 本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。