英语论文网

s particularly high or whether in the few cases under consideration the justification raised by the dominant firms were just not supported by facts.” The few cases considered by the Commission and the European Courts still leave many questions unanswered. The EC regulation of tying is not well-defined and does not seem like a just and fair regulation. In particular, it is hard to understand that tying practices by a dominant firm which enhance efficiencies are automatically caught by Article 82 whilst non-dominant firms can get away with various competition-restricting tying arrangements.

A small number of cases considered by the Commission gives rise to the argument “that the Commission uses implicit “prescreening” criteria that are not reflected in a comparison of the explicit assessment criteria.” This creates uncertainty and distrust with the enforcement institutions which appear to rely on their own ‘unwritten codes'.

The analysis above shows that EC regulation of tying is clearly inadequate and over-zealous. Such a regime can easily lead to potentially absurd results “[a] dominant car manufacturer, for example, who does not offer his cars without engine or shock absorbers, i.e. who bundles the various car components, clearly risks contravening article 82, despite the fact that all other nondominant manufacturers act in the same way (Tetra Pak II) and that this does not foreclose any component manufacturer (British Sugar).”

This inadequate protection needs to be resolved by adopting a test similar to the rule of reason approach of the US courts that would perform the balancing exercise of any potential efficiencies of tying against the detriments to competition. In addition, illegal tying practices need to be tacked at all fronts and this would possibly require extending anti-tying rules to non-dominant firms as well.
本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。