英语论文网

d other force enablers required; underlines the need for capable battalions effectively able to carry out UNAMID's mandated tasks: in this regard requests the continuing assistance of donors in ensuring battalions are suitably trained and equipped and futher requests UNAMID to examine how it could maximize the use of its capabilities in Darfur.”

Challenges

The Hybrid Nature of the Operation

One of the main challenges faced by the United Nations in its quest to broker a peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict was the reluctance of the GoS to let foreign forces enter its territory. Under the premise of African solutions to African problems, the approach to the conflict had to be predominantly African in nature. The solution, approved by the GoS in 2007, was to pour the African Union into the equation and merge its African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a new UN peacekeeping operation.

UNAMID was the result of this agreement. According to resolution 1769, it has a single chain of command and control structure provided by the United Nations but a reporting mechanism that should also keep the AU informed. On the ground, the operation works as any other UN operation, “the overall management of the operation will be based on United Nations standards, principles and established practices.” (S/Res/1769) This approach quickly brought more problems into the table when problems surfaced during deployment. Because the hybrid mission was only accountable to the United Nations, the joint reporting mechanism was not working properly. In practice, UNAMID only reported to the DSGPKO. Therefore, it was difficult for all the information necessary to jointly manage UNAMID to reach the AU.

Furthermore, African troop contributors did not have the necessary logistical skills or technology to be able to implement a mandate of this magnitude and the GoS was still reluctant to allow non-African troops to enter the country. There was also the concern that AMIS battalions were not up to UN standards at the time when UNAMID assumed authority over AMIS troops.

These concerns have been addressed through close consultations between the UN and AU. Efforts, for example to put battalions up to standards are evidenced in successive reports by the Secretary General and international exhortations by UNSC resolutions, notably resolution 1828. A tripartite talks mechanism involving the AU, UN and the GoS has facilitated the communication between the three entities to assure unity of action and government cooperation. “The tripartite mechanism has become an extremely effective toop for ensuring that operational impediments faced by the mission are identified and addressed.” (s/2009/352)

The predominantly African nature of the operation poses logistics problems, but it also addresses the concern of not only the GoS but of many African countries that outside interference with African issues has, in the past, exacerbated conflicts and hindered peace processes. Furthermore, this type of operation was correctly instituted, as it was the only choice at a time when the government was reluctant to accept the expansion of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) mandate to Darfur, violence was escalating, and the existing mechanisms, namely AMIS, were insufficient to cope with the increasing complexity of the problem. The premise of African sol