英语论文网

turn to higher wages. Of course this assumes that workers in this equilibrium, W () are risk averse and that equilibrium increases in . And the optimal choice is obtained when each worker searching for a job and the worker while enrolled on the degree of risk (). Risk is determined by firms by comparing costs to minimize occupational risks in the workplace in terms of returns in the form of lower wages for workers, and considering the limitations of their technologies that they have. W () is the equilibrium function that describes the number of workers who apply for jobs at their preferred amount of risk that is equal to the number of jobs available on the market that have their own risk. Therefore serving W () as an equilibrium device that matches workers and firms, price has the same role in normal markets (ibid: 269).

 

Results obtained in the first part can summarize as followed:

 

The relationship between wages and risk represent two functions is given by the lower bound by a set of acceptable wage functions and the upper bound function of a set of acceptable pay offer.

 

Marginal supply and demand in the approach described above involves the identification of observed wage differentials and risk rates for businesses and workers who choose the specific job risks.

 

Requirements for the price of the security or the supply price of risk identified in the mentioned above underestimates the average supply price of labor to these risks, since those who choose risky jobs have an advantage in bearing risk. Like the latter, the demand price of risk, identified by highly risky jobs overestimates the average demand rate for most companies, since companies with risky jobs have comparative disadvantages also by producing security.

 

The explanation of point (2) only represents single points of supply and demand compensation function and not the function itself. Use of such numbers for evaluation overestimates the profits to the consumer by increases in the final safety, because worker's demand for compensation to safety is negatively inclined (ibid: 283).

 

Thaler and Rosen (1975) specified a simple demand model mentioned above. Discussion of the real issue here is how many wage-descriptive and risk interaction is to allow in the regression. If there is no interaction between worker characteristics and safety in production, for each value of risk appears only one risk premium in the market (ibid: 284).

 

Moreover, there is no interaction between worker characteristics and attitudes in wage-risk feature since it is independent. The differences in worker characteristics resulting to accept wage function will only help to identify what works accept riskier jobs. But if there is interaction in production, according to personal characteristic differential本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。