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国际商务管理学是一门建立在经济学、管理学、国际贸易理论和实务、商务沟通理论、市场营销学等一系列经济、管理理论基础之上的应用学科。国际商务管理学的研究对象是国际商务活动的环境、业务活动过程及其规律性，强调国际商务活动的事务层面，留学生国际商务管理论文定制即展开各项国际商务活动的程序，在内容上具有综合性、应用性、实践性和程序性的特点。

The Choice of Payment Method in European
Mergers and Acquisitions
MARA FACCIO and RONALD W. MASULIS

ABSTRACT
We study merger and acquisition (M&A) payment choices of European bidders forpublicly and privately held targets in the 1997–2000 period. Europe is an ideal venuefor studying the importance of corporate governance in makingM&Apayment choices,given the large number of closely held firms and the wide range of capital markets,institutional settings, laws, and regulations. The tradeoff between corporate governanceconcerns and debt financing constraints is found to have a large bearing on thebidder’s payment choice. Consistent with earlier evidence, we find that several dealand target characteristics significantly affect the method of payment choice.GLOBAL MERGER AND ACQUISITION (M&A) activity has grown dramatically over thelast 10 years, bringing with it major changes in the organization and control ofeconomic activity around the world. Yet there is much about the M&A processthat we do not fully understand, including the choice of payment method. Giventhe large size of many M&A transactions, the financing decision can have asignificant impact on an acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, andsubsequent financing decisions. The financing decision can also have seriouscorporate control, risk bearing, tax, and cash flow implications for the buyingand selling firms and shareholders. In this study, we examine the choice ofpayment method and its determinants across a large sample of European M&Atransactions.
While most M&A research is based on U.S. transactions, focusing on the U.S.data has the disadvantage of holding many institutional factors relatively fixed.By studying merger activity across a broad sample of European bidders, we arebetter able to evaluate the importance of a wide range of ownership structures,corporate governance rules, corporate laws, securities regulations, and marketconditions, which is not possible with the U.S. data. With respect to ownershipconcentration, Faccio and Lang (2002) document that 63% of their sample oflisted firms across 13 Western European countries have a single large shareholder,who directly or indirectly controls at least 20% of their votes. This is in∗Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University. We thank Utpal Bhattacharya,Harry DeAngelo, Tim Loughran, Rob Stambaugh (the editor), and especially an anonymous refereefor his/her insightful comments and suggestions. We also want to thank seminar participants at
he Melbourne Business School, University of Miami, University of New SouthWales, University ofotre Dame, University of Pittsburgh, University of South Carolina, Vanderbilt University, and the
16th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference for helpful comments.We are also appreciativeof research support from the Financial Markets Research Center at Vanderbilt University.
1345
1346 The Journal of Finance
sharp contrast to the United States, where only 28% of listed corporations havea large shareholder who controls 20% or more of its votes.1 Moreover, Europeanstock markets operate under significantly different rules and regulations, havemore variable trading activity, and exhibit widely varying industry concentrationlevels compared t本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。