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摘要：西班牙巴利亚多利德大学金融经济学硕士论文定制,本留学硕士论文探索了董事会在银行公司治理中的作用。巴塞尔银行监管委员会（BCBS）银行监管需要研究，了解和改善金融实体企业治理。特别是巴塞尔委员会治理结构组成的董事会和高级管理BCBS信息的核心，此外，委员会认为企业治理是必要的，以保证一个有声音财政体系，因此，也有利于一个国家的经济发展。

>Regulation presents several challenges in the field of corporategovernance. Even though regulation can be considered an additionalmechanism of corporate governance, in most situations it reducesthe effectiveness of other mechanisms in coping withcorporate governance problems. This is the case when regulationimposes bank ownership restrictions, or when it reduces operationsallowed to banks and applies coefficients that lessen competitionin the industry, or when it designs a deposit insurance thatrestricts depositors’ supervision. Moreover, the main aim of the
regulator, which is to reduce systemic risk, might come into conflict
with the main goal of shareholders, which is to increase sharevalue. The conflicting goals introduce a new agency problem.
The role of boards as a mechanism for corporate governance ofbanks takes on special relevance in a framework of limited competition,intense regulation, and higher informational asymmetriesdue to the complexity of the banking business. Thus, the board becomesa key mechanism to monitor managers’ behavior and to advisethem on strategy identification and implementation. Bankdirectors’ specific knowledge of the complexity of the bankingbusiness enables them to monitor and advise managers efficiently.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 983423334; fax: +34 983183830.
E-mail addresses: pandres@eco.uva.es (P.de Andres), teyo@eco.uva.es (E.
Vallelado).
Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (2008) 2570–2580
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
journal homepage:

The authors especially thank two anonymous referees for manyuseful suggestions and benefit from the valuable comments of J.P.Abrahams, Y. Altumbas, J.M. Campa, M.A. García-Cestona, A.I.Fernández, T. Garderner, F. Gascón, V. González, J. Lopez Gracia,
I. Mathur (the editor), P. Molyneux, J. Montoriol, J.A. Rodríguez,M. Santamaría, G. Szego (the former editor), D. Urbano, N. Utrero,
as well as participants at the Wolpertinger Conference (Cracow),at the UAB Seminars (Barcelona) and at the 5th Workshop in
Finance. They also thank Sandra Sizer for editorial assistance.Financial support from UCEIF Foundation is also acknowledged.
Any errors are the responsibility of the authors. This paper wasoriginally submitted to Professor Giorgio Szego on July 20, 2006and was revised twice prior to submission through EES.Appendix. Regulation, ownership and banking systemcharacteristics
Panel A: Bank activity and ownership restrictiveness (BAOR)
measures the overall degree to which banks are permitted to engage
in securities, insurance, and real estate activities, and the extent
to which they can own non-financial firms. The measures
range from one to four. The lowest value indicates that no restrictions
are placed on this type of diversification by banks. The highest
value indicates that such diversification is prohibited. We build
three dummy variables from the BAOR index: Canada, France,
Spain, and the UK have the lowest BAOR values, Italy is in the middle,
and the US has the highest value. Official supervisory power
(OSP) measures whether officials have the authority to take specific
action to prevent and correct problems. This measure ranges
from 0 to 16. The higher the value, the more power officials have.
We build three dummy variables from the OSP index: one each for
Canada, France and Italy; Spain and the UK; and the US Prompt本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。