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asic premises of 'partnership'. This is not to suggest, however, that trade union representatives are falling prey to the seductive appeal of management rhetoric, far from it. They recognise that for partnership to emerge as an effective long-term arrangement it requires more than just a simple ideological attachment to the firm, rather, effective partnerships are predicated on stable institutional relations that deliver qualitative improvements at work and genuine material returns. It is only within this context that one can begin to discuss the benefits of mutuality as a long-term outcome. Mutuality has to be earned. It is at this level, that our findings are less optimistic.

Our findings also suggest that there is a fundamental deficit in terms of the presence and effectiveness of voice mechanisms at work. This is notable in two respects. First, there is the dominance of direct methods of communications over indirect methods. Second, there is the lack of institutional involvement over the set of issues that constitute the 'new' industrial relations. This is a worrying finding, because, for many commentators, the consensus driven, partnership approach is predicated on these very issues (see, for example, Leisink, 1993). This lack of institutional involvement is further compounded by a weak set of workplace guarantees. For example, whilst union respondents generally accepted that 'employment security should be dependent upon greater flexibility', few agreed that management had become more committed to employment security. Even fewer reported that they had seen an increased investment by management in the quality of their members' working lives. In other words, whilst trade union representatives appear open to the responsibilities placed upon them in the 'third way' rhetoric of partnership, there is little evidence to suggest that management has reciprocated.

These findings have important consequences for the likely development of partnership at the British workplace. Clearly, trade union interest in, and commitment to, partnership is not open-ended. Trade unionists make strategic calculations with regards to the effectiveness and nature of the institutional relations they enter into, not just in terms of their development but also in terms of their ability to manage difference, conflict and failure. That is, strategic calculations are made about management's interest in and ability to deliver on ongoing issues that are addressed by the discourse of partnership, such as training, employability, and the working environment. Thus, in the British context, the issue of voice and workplace guarantees impacts on the development of partnership because of the scale of risk confronting trade unionists when engaging with partnership arrangements. As the work of Higgins (1996) reminds us, partnership relations at the workplace are contingent on the principles of 'mutual trust' and 'efficacy'. On this basis, the principle of 'mutual trust' suggests it is unfair for one party to incur significant costs and risks if other parties are not prepared to accept similar sacrifices: whilst the 'efficacy principle' suggests it is unfair for one party to incur risks and costs if it would only benefit those unwilling to behave in a similar manner. In the absence of such assurances, parties are more likely to engage in 'shrewd' rather than co-operative bargaining arrangements. Our findings suggest that tra