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. Sidney Callahan states that “the human emotional system is a universal component of human functioning, the primary motivating system of all activity, including of course, thinking about ethical dilemmas.” [37] Our emotions are generally our first alert to something that we must confront. Most of our decisions as human beings are not just intellectual decisions. Most of our decisions combine our emotional sensitivities with our intellectual reasoning. It is quite possible that emotional responses in the form of empathy for the victim helped instigate a shift away from Vedic sacrifice for the authors of the Upanisads. As Callahan states, “Many moral revolutions have been initiated by empathy felt for previously excluded groups: slaves, women, workers, children, the handicapped, experimental subjects, patients in institutions. As I emotionally respond to another person or group, I may be forced to confront a conflicting moral attitude concerning the group.” [38] Empathy for the victim of a sacrificial system falls into this category as well.

The intense drama of the passion of Christ may have caused the breakdown of the cycle of sacrificial violence in the West, but a subtler, smaller scale, slower shift occurred in ancient India. Maybe seeing the absurdity of the horse sacrifice and an accompanying sense of the superficiality of the material rewards of the sacrifice, were enough to cause the writers of the Upanisads to leave society and seek brahman. They abandoned the violence just the same and formed peaceful communities that together sought truth and unity with the infinite.

The newfound importance of atman in the Upanisads is quite significant in investigating this move away from sacrifice. As I stated earlier, the idea of the self and its connection to ultimate reality was a shift from the material nature of the sacrifice. The concept of atman allowed for community and continuity between all beings regardless of caste or even species. It seems quite possible that the concept of atman was the intellectual development that accompanied an emotional response to the sacrifice. In short, if one acknowledges that he or she is essentially the same as the victim of the sacrifice (we are both atman/brahman), then it is much harder for that individual to scapegoat and kill that victim. In my opinion, the concept of atman not only makes sacrifice unnecessary because it is superficial and dwells in the material realm; it also makes sacrifice unacceptable on moral grounds.

I suggest that the shift from the material rewards of Vedic sacrifice to the focus on the absolute reality of atman/brahman found in the Upanisads was probably a result of both empathy for the victim and the intellectual pursuit to find an alternative to reinforce that empathetic response. It is unlikely that it was solely an intellectual operation.

This insight did not effect permanent change to the whole of Vedic culture. Nonetheless, it did allow for a life without sacrifice for the individuals who chose to follow the contemplative journey towards brahman and it did lay the groundwork for the concept of nonviolence that would come to the fore in Buddhist and Jain philosophies.

Bailie argues that the only event in history that can loosen the hold of the sacrificial system and the scapegoat mechanism is the crucifixion of Jesus. I would urge him, however, to look seriously