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Balanced Asset Specificity - another decision of transaction cost theory to preserve the relationship between two members of a strategic alliance is the equal contribution of specific assets of each partner to the alliance. As prices only partly mediate alliances, actors demand their partners' mutual commitment by sharing investments in alternative or complementary technology, market information or access, as well as reputation or credibility. [76]

Hostages - the existence of other current relationships between the partners to the focal alliance is called hostage arrangement. Using hostages as a safeguard supposes the possibility of punishment for any opportunistic behavior in the focal alliance. Buckley and Casson (1988) have argued that all the partners must refrain from cheating to maintain their strong relations. A modus for facilitating a 'mutual forbearance' is the existence of other current relationships (i.e.,hostages). According to Williamson (1985) organizations having more than one alliance with the same partners create a “mutual hostage” arrangement. Furthermore, involvement in more than one collaborative relationship makes the focal joint venture more stable. Therefore, it is more likely for alliance members with multiple current relationships among themselves to be willing to modify the existing relationship in order to guard its survival. [77]

5.4 Information asymmetry

On the one hand, information symmetry is another form of safeguarding extensive interfirm relationships by sharing information between partners in the focal alliance. For instance, Japanese automotive transactors share more information than their U.S. counterparts do. As a result, they reduce the information asymmetry and the potential for opportunism (see Table 1). Consequently, the level of transaction costs diminishes and, referring to the neoclassical economics, is even assumed zero because transactors have perfect information. On the other hand, information asymmetry could be an incentive for transactors to act opportunistically. That is why, Japanese automakers require significant cost, quality, and production information from their suppliers. For example, on Table 1 we can see that Toyota shares more information with its suppliers comparing to other automakers. Meanwhile, Toyota demands more information from its suppliers to make the relationship stronger. It is clearly shown on Table 2 that the hazard of opportunistic behavior of Toyotas' suppliers is highly unlikely in their relationship with it than in alliances with other automaker like Chrisler, Ford, GM and Nissan. That is to say, that sharing crucial information with its suppliers, Toyota averts cases of opportunistic behavior in its exchange relationships. Furthermore, manufacturers appreciate that the supplier can perform as promised. Hence, they want to ascertain the capabilities of the supplier. However, increasing the degree of information sharing leads to a decrease in information asymmetries, which reduces contracting and monitoring costs because both parties conduct negotiations with similar info本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。