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s actions, even in unexpected or/and new situations. [61] Referring to the literature about interorganizational relationships, there persists a constant disagreement if relationships between organizations based on trust are beneficial for their ability to adapt to a changing environment or unforeseen problems that could occur. For instance, Lorenz (1988) thinks that alliances based on trust are able to survive greater obstacles and are more adaptive. Doz (1996) also thinks partnerships built on trust over the time are very adaptable and usually survive longer. [62]

 

Furthermore, referring to the social exchange theorists credible commitments, hostages or credible commitments are not the cause for trust because they do not require “leap” and are more applicable in cases where no or just little trust is present. The social exchange theorists talk about the existence of two important trust sources. One of them is reputation and it could be created over the time of partnership or could lie with the knowledge of how previous relationships have turned out. The trust source based on reputation is a combination of both – length of partner relationship and knowledge about previous relations. The other main trust source, called 'shared values' is sharing similar values. Sharing values demands solely current knowledge about partners. Sharing of values is a mixture of communication and understanding which values and goals the partner has as well. [63]

 

5.2 Contractual safeguards

 

There is still an argument if trust substitutes or complements the contractual safeguards. Referring to transaction cost theory, Lui and Ngo (2004) base their study on both – trust and safeguards as key control mechanisms in non-equity partnerships and it creates a model that connects the trust and the contractual safeguards to cooperative results. [64]

 

There are two mechanisms of contractual safeguards to restrict opportunism. First, the pay-off structure could be changed by raising the cost in case that one of the partners is acting only in his own interest. It costs more resources to break rules, which are already negotiated and refer that an opportunistic behavior must be punished. Second, monitoring costs could be reduced by increasing the transparency of interorganizational relations and including clauses in the contract defining which objects must be monitored. Clear contractual conditions of permissive actions can help decreasing the level of transaction ambiguity. Lui and Ngo (2004) claim that if an actor in a non-equity alliance is likely to behave opportunistically, the firm should increase the contractual safeguards. [65]

 

5.3 Transaction specific investments/assets

 

Steven S. Lui and Hang-Yue Ngo (2004) argue that specific assets could be a reason for interorganizational dependence. They base their arguments on dependence theory, which claims that related tra本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。