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论文作者:meisishow论文属性:学术文章 Scholarship Essay登出时间:2014-06-30编辑:meisishow点击率:16345
论文字数:28574论文编号:org201406271208262212语种:英语 English地区:英国价格:免费论文
关键词:M41M46G12G14G30M33,Economic Value
摘要:经济增加值(EVA)已经引起了相当大的关注作为替代传统会计收益用于评估和激励补偿。现在的顾问营销相关指标,许多索赔了——大多数基于坊间证据或内部研究。本文总结了独立证据对伊娃的所谓优势。我们首先回顾的理论联系潜在的剩余收益,股东价值的概念。
Investing more relative to the control firms in the pre-adoption period. Each of these changes is significant at conventional levels. However, it is difficult to interpret whether an observed reduction in net investment is a value-increasing action since it is possible that managers are reducing positive NPV projects – not just projects earning below their cost of capital. Critics of RI-based compensation plans claim that they provide incentives for managers to under-invest in positive NPV projects. Proponents and users of RI-based incentives claim otherwise.26 Financing decisions also should be influenced by the adoption of RI-based incentives. Given that holding capital that earns less than WACC penalizes RI, we expect to observe increased payouts to shareholders. If these payouts reflect discrete one-time responses to new RI-based compensation incentives and tax incentives, we are more likely to see an increase in share repurchases than in regular cash dividends:27 Q6: Do share repurchases and dividend payouts increase for firms adopting residual income-based compensation plans (relative to non-adopters)? As shown in Figure 5, both repurchases per share and dividends per share increase in the postadoption period relative to the pre-adoption period. Relative to the matched-pair control firms, residual income adopters on average dramatically increased repurchases per share ($1.09 or 112%) but only slightly increased dividends per share ($0.13 or 1%). Only repurchases per share are significant at conventional levels. These findings suggest that managers faced with higher investment hurdle rates under RI return excess capital to shareholders in a tax-favored manner that does not signal a permanent change in dividend payout.
If their pay or prospects are tied to periodic accounting performance, managers may avoid positive NPV projects that are slow to pay off. It has been argued that RI, because it tends to apply a higher investment hurdle rate of return, will exacerbate this tendency. Perhaps one of the most vocal critics is the consulting firm Boston Consulting Group. See, for example, Eric Olsen in the October 1996 Boston Consulting Group publication, Perspectives. For a rebuttal, see John Shiely, COO of Briggs and Stratton, an EVA firm. Mr. Shiely’s response was published in the February 1997 Stern Stewart publication, EVANGELIST™.
Finally, if managers take actions consistent with RI incentives, firms that adopt RI incentives should produce increased residual income: Q7: Does residual income increase for firms adopting residual income-based compensation plans (relative to non-adopters)? Here the evidence reveals that following adoption of RI-based incentive plans, the RI firms relative to the control firms increased residual income by a statistically significant average of nearly $190 million annually (almost 1300%). This result is consistent with the adage that you get what you measure and reward. Although these results suggest that the adoption of residual income based incentives alter management decisions in ways that should contribute to shareholder wealth, several caveats are in order. First, firms that adopt new incentive本论文由英语论文网提供整理,提供论文代写,英语论文代写,代写论文,代写英语论文,代写留学生论文,代写英文论文,留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。