s of suspected Islamic militants into jail,
tried them in military courts, and raided their hideouts in coves and sugarcane
fields with guns blazing. After convicting 72 extremists in a mass trial,
the government declared that ‘‘the heads of the terrorists have been falling,
and nothing remains except a few fugitives’’; see Ref. 4. However, a day
later, those ‘‘few fugitives’’ showed what horror they could produce. Several
terrorists threw flaming bottles of gasoline at a tour bus and raked the
passengers with gunfire. Nine German tourists and the Egyptian driver died
in this blaze just outside the Cairo Egyptian Museum.
The reaction was a wave of cancellations and an increasing protection
by police forces. After a while, the hope of the terrorists to deprive the state
of vital revenues from tourisms was not fulfilled. The periodic ups and
downs of tourism and terrorism provide an example of an interdependent
oscillatory system.Travelers have been associated always with increasing vulnerability tovarious types of crime. But, throughout most of
history, tourists were individualvictims of crime and targets for major acts of political violence. Sincethe late 1960s, terroristic violence has increased substantially.The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation for theinfluence of terrorism on tourism and how a country should deal with that.The motivation for this is that the prey–predator relationship between tourismand terrorism need to be understood not only in terms of security andmarketing, but also in terms of site development, employment policies, andenforcement management. To reach this aim, a dynamic model is formulated
where the country government is the decision maker. The objective is
to maximize the income generated by the tourism industry. Terrorists are
JOTA: VOL. 108, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2001 285
attracted by large amount of tourists. In order to reduce terrorism, the
government could allocate some means to terrorism enforcement. Furthermore,the government can attract tourists by making investments in thetourism industry. Investments are more efficient in terms of attracting touristsif there is not much terrorism around. This makes it understandablethat one of our results is that investment programs in the tourism industryare accompanied by large terrorism enforcement expenditures.Our main result is that, for reasonable parameter values, the resultingoptimal solution exhibits a cyclical behavior which can be explained as follows.Assume that the starting point is a country with a small tourism industryand not much terrorism around. Then, the country starts to invest inorder to increase the number of tourists visiting this country. Concreteexamples of tourism investments are e.g. building hotels, ski lifts, preservingnature in national parks, and so on and so forth; see Ref. 5. Increasingtourism attracts terrorism, which then grows with the amount of tourists.Eventually, the high terrorism level distracts tourists from visiting thiscountry and also lowers the tourism industry investment climate. Therefore,
tourism as well as tourism investments will drop. As a result of this, the
amount of terrorists will drop too. In this way, the old situation with a
small tourism industry occurs again from where the whole thing will be
repeated.
The contents of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the model is
presented. In Section 3, the model is analyzed by
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