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law essay

作为2009年的经济危机产生的后果，政治领导人正越来越多地掩盖来自全球的竞争性市场国家在市场收缩的时间。截至2008年，153个成员国和30个观察国是世界贸易组织（WTO）的缔约国。[1]在全球产出可能减少甚至停止的情况下，世贸组织的重要性正日益显露出来，而国家也在寻找方法拯救国内产业。可以预期的是，如果世贸组织的主要目的是通过限制贸易壁垒自由化的全球贸易和经济发展， WTO的司法部门在开发一个判例以鼓励贸易自由化。争端解决机构（DSB）的决定导致了国家实施贸易限制，而不是贸易自由化。

不同于传统的国内法庭，DNA双链断裂必须借鉴其他学科，如商业、政治学、经济学和法学的更大的杠杆作用。该过程还涉及很多不仅仅是当事人更多的参与者，如非政府组织

I Introduction

As a consequence of the economic crisis of 2009, political leaders are increasingly sheltering their countries from global competitive markets during a time of market contractions. As of 2008, 153 member nations and 30 observing nations are party to the World Trade Organization (WTO). [1] The importance of the WTO is increasingly come to light, as a halt to the potential reduction in global outputs, while countries look inwardly to save domestic industry. If the main purpose of the WTO is to liberalize global trade and economic development by restricting trade barriers, it would be expected that the WTO’s judicial branch would develop a jurisprudence that encouraged trade-liberalization. The decisions handed down by the Dispute Settlement Bodies (DSB) have led countries to implement trade-restrictive, instead of trade-liberalizing, measures. [2]

Unlike a traditional domestic court, the DSBs must draw from a greater leverage of other disciplines, such as business, politics, economics and law. The process also involves many more actors than just the parties, such as Non-Governmental Organizations, Inter-Governmental Organizations, and non-state actors, which affect a significant population globally. The accession of China and the rising use of the system by developing countries have caused a significant shift in the expected policies and Proposals of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Balancing on a teeter-totter between diplomacy and law, the DSB has difficulty adhering to either, doing neither justice. Does the AB need increased guidance? Does the current DSU structure need change? Should the WTO increasingly meddle in sensitive democratic processes in sovereign countries?

Recently, the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) adjudication and enforcement of trading issues, has been met with sharp criticism. The AB’s actions have limited its ability to fulfill its primary purpose, of ensuring the proper functioning of the trade liberalization regime. Article 19 of the DSU states that “where a panel or the AB concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.” [3] This broad wording can lead to contradictory results. In the Australia – Salmon case, “bringing a measure into conformity” mean both raising a trade barrier or lowering a trade barrier. [4] AB’s decisions often lead to the introduction of more, rather than less, trade-restrictive measures in the losing party country. [5] Taking into account the current economic climate, the AB’s decisions would serve to encourage the formation of trade barriers by giving countries a choice in compliance. The general structure of domestic policy tends to lead to states adopting the more restrictive measure in implementation.

Some would argue that the AB only has the power specified in Article 19 of the DSU. It provides that “where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a